

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-02 ACDA-05

NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00 SAJ-01

SS-15 NSC-05 ERDA-05 EURE-00 /066 W

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P R 041520Z MAR 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 418

SEECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

USLOSACLANT

CINCLANT

S E C R E T USNATO 1155

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, MNUC

SUBJECT: WINTEXT-75

REF: DPC/D(69)59.

SUMMARY: AS WASHINGTON IS AWARE, DPC WILL PARTICIPATE IN WINTEXT-75 DURING PERIOD FROM 0900GMT, MARCH9, TO NO LATER THAN 2300 GMT, MARCH10, PRIMARILY FOR PURPOSE FOR EXERCISING NATO GUIDELINES FOR CONSULTATION PROCEDURES ON THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS(REF). THIS WILL BE ONLY THE SECOND TIME THAT NATO POLITICAL AUTHROITIES HAVE PARTICIPATED IN EXERCISE CONSULTATIONS ON THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE FIRST BEING IN WINTEXT-73. THE MATTER OF HOW NATO WOULD PROCEED TO THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS SENSITIVE, EVEN IF EXERCISE PLAU BOTH BECAUSE OF HOW ALLIES VIEEW THEIR ROLE IN THE DE CISION-MAKING PROCESS LEADING TO THE USE OF NUCLEAR WAPONS, AND BECAUSE OF US RESPONSIBILTIES FOR RELEASE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR OPERATIONAL USE. THIS MESSAGE ALERTS US PARTICIPANTS TO SOME DIFFERENCES IN ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN WINTEXT-75 AND WINTEX-73 THAT COULD AFFECT PROCESS OF CONSULTA- TIONS IN DPC. END SUMMARY.

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1. THERE ARE TWO PROVISIONS IN ARRANGEMENTS FOR WINTEX-UT THAT DIFFER FROM WINTEX-73 AND COULD AFFECT THE WAY NUCLEAR CONSULTATIONS COULD DEVELOP. FIRST, WHEREAS IN WINTEXT-73 ACTIVE DPC PARTICIPATION CEASED WHEN THE NUCLEAR POWER MADE A

DECISION ON A RELEASE REQUEST, IN WINTEX-75 ACTIVE DPC  
PARTICIPATION MIGHT CONTINUE BEYOND THAT POINT (UP TO AS  
LATE AS 2300 GMT, MARCH10). A SITUATION COULD ARISE, THEREFORE,  
IN WHICH THE DPC COULD BE IN SESSION (E.G., TO DISCUSS ANY  
ADDITIONAL RELEASE REQUESTS THAT MAY HAVE COME IN, OR FOR ANY  
OTHER PURPOSE) AFTER THE NUCLEAR POWER HAS REPLIED TO AN MNC'S  
INITIAL ROMEO(REQUEST) MESSAGE, AND THUS COULD ENGAGE IN  
A "DISCUSSION" OF THE DECISION RENEREED. IN SUCH A SITUATION,  
USNATO WILL ATTEMPT TO SEE THAT THE TERMS OF THE NATO  
CONSULTATION GUIDELINES (REF) ARE OBSERVED. FOR EXAMPLE,  
WE WOULD , IF NECESSARY, CALL ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT, WHILE  
NUCLEAR POWERS WILL, TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCES PERMITTING, CONSIDER  
NATIONAL VIEWS ON DESIRABILITY OF GRANTING REQUEST FOR USE OF  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ONCE DECISION OF NUCLEAR POWER IS MADE AND  
COMMUNICATED TO MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS, INFO DPC AND CAPITALS,  
THAT COMMUNICATION CONSTITUES MAJOR NATO COMMANDERRS' AUTHORITY  
TO EMPLOY WEAPONS IN QUESTION, AND NO FURTHER ACTION ON THE  
PART OF DPC IS REQUIRED.

2. CONCERNING THE SECOND DIFFERENCE, IN WINTEX-73 SACEUR,  
ALGOUGH ABLE TO SUBMIT MORE THAN ONE ROMEO(REQUEST) MESSAGE,  
WAS REQUIRED TO PRESENT THEM TO THE DPC AND CAPITALS AS A  
"SINGLE PACKAGE" CONSTITUTING THE INITIAL USEOF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.  
(SACEUR IN FACT SUBMITTED SIMULTANEOUSLY SEPARATE REQUESTS  
COVERING US AND UK WEAPONS). THE SAME REQUIREMENT DOES NOT AP-  
PLY TO WINTEX-75. IT IS POSSIBLE THERFORE, THAT SEPARATE RE-  
QUESTS COVERING US AND UK WEAPONS, WHICH SET VARYINGDEADLINES  
FOR REPLIES AND WERE RELATED TO DIFFERENT MILITARY CIRCUMSTANCES  
(AS WELL AS SEPARATEREQUESTS FROM SACEUR AND CACLANT), COULD BE  
SUBMITTED TO THE NUCLEAR POWERS, INFO DPC AND CAPITALS. SUCH A  
SITUATION COULD PRODUCE A FAR MORE COMPLICATED PROCESS OF  
CONSULTATIONS IN THEDPC THAN TOOK PLACE IN WINTEX-73,  
MAKING ITMORE LKKELY THAT THERE COULD BE SPLITS IN ALLIED VIEWE.  
MISSION BELIEVES WE SHOULD SEEK TO MINIMIZE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCH  
A SITUATION AND DEAL TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE WITH RELEASE REQUESTS  
AS A WHOLE, AND IN TERMS OF "INITIAL" USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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MISSION PRESUMES THAT MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS, DURING THIS  
CRITICAL PERIOD OF EXERCISE PLAY, WILL FORMULATE THEIR  
REQUESTS FOR RELEASE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO  
FACILITATE THE STATED PURPOSE OF DPC PLAY.

3. MISSION RECOGNIZES THAT TIMING OF WASHINGTON'S DECISION  
ON RELEASE REQUESTS CONCERNING US NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL OF  
NECESSITY DEPEND UPONDEADLINE SET IN A MAJOR NATO COMMANDER'S  
ROMEO MESSAGE(S). WE EXPECT SYG TO CONVENE DPC TO PROVIDE  
OPPORTUNITY FOR EXPRESSION OF NATIONAL VIEWS IN ADEQUATE  
TIME TO ALLOW FOR REPORTING THOSE VIEWS (BY SYG AS WELL AS BY  
US AND UK MISSIONS) TO WASHINGTON AND LONDONG,  
AND FOR DECISIONS MAKING IN THOSE CAPITALS.  
HOWEVER, IN THE EVENT SOME CAPITALS ARE SLOW IN GETTING

INSTRUCTIONS TO THEIR DELEGATIONS HERE, THERE COULD BE  
SOME DELAYS IN THE CONSULTATION PROCESS, AND THE NUCLEAR  
POWER(S) MAY FIND IT NECESSARY TO MAKE A DECISION BEFORE  
GEARING FROM ALL DPC MEMBERS, HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO GAIN FULL  
BENEFIT OF EXERCISE, WE WOULD HOPE THAT  
WASHINGTON WOULD ALLOW MAXIMUM TIME FOR EXPRESSION AND  
CONSIDERATION OF NATIONAL VIEWS CONSISTENT WITH THE MILITARY  
EXIGENCIES EXPRESSED IN A MAJOR NATO COMMANDER'S RELEASE  
REQUEST MESSAGE (SLM)

4. AS IN THE CASE OF WINTER-73, WE ARE INCLINED TO BELIEVE  
THAT, FOR PURPOSES OF THIS EXERCISE, US POSITION IN DPC ON  
SUBSTANCE OF WARNING AND REQUEST MESSAGES AFFECTING US  
WEAPONS SHOULD BE ESSENTIALLY NEUTRAL, SO AS TO AVOID SEEMING  
TO PREJUDGE LATER WASHINGTON DECISION. WASHINGTON MAY VERY  
WELL, HOWEVER, WISH TO INSTRUCT US TO EXPRESS A VIEW ON  
MESSAGES CONCERNING UK WEAPONS. IN ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS,  
WE DO NOT EXPECT TO EXPRESS A VIEW ON SUBSTANCE OF REQUESTS  
FOR EITHER US OR UK WEAPONS.

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USNMR SHAPE  
USLOSACLANT  
CINCLANT  
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